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In his paper, “Causation in psycho-
analysis,” Dr Nikolai Axmacher raises
and responds to three arguments that
claim that psychoanalytic explanations
and causal explanations in the neuro-
logical sciences are mutually inconsistent.
These arguments, he claims, are raised by
many opponents of neuropsychoanalysis,
who argue that psychoanalytic explana-
tions, because they are hermeneutic in
character, cannot be consistent with causal
explanations in the sciences. Axmacher
disputes these arguments, and attempts
to show that the apparent differences
between hermeneutical and causal expla-
nations are merely apparent; he thereby
hopes to defend “the neuropsychoana-
lytic endeavor” (Axmacher, 2013, p. 3).
I examine Axmacher’s responses to the
three arguments he raises; I shall argue
that two of them are indeed insufficient to
raise concerns about the neuropsychoana-
lytic project, but one of the arguments—
Argument Two—does raise concerns that
Axmacher’s responses do not consider.
Axmacher hopes to show that causal and
hermeneutic explanations are, at least in
principle, consistent with each other by
showing that hermeneutic psychoanalytic
explanations also appeal to causal princi-
ples. I argue that even if the latter claim
is true, fundamental differences between
psychoanalytic explanations, and scientific
causal explanations, remain.
At the heart of the inconsistency
between psychoanalysis and neuroscience
is, claims Axmacher, a difference in kinds
of explanation: psychoanalysis relies on
hermeneutic explanations, which “are
epistemologically problematic because
they typically act in a retroactive man-
ner . . . but do not make predictions”
(Axmacher, 2013, p. 1), while neuro-
science appeals to causal explanations that
both explain and predict on the basis
of scientific laws. Axmacher examines
three specific arguments that “suggest
that hermeneutic reconstructions are
fundamentally inconsistent with causal
explanations” (Axmacher, 2013, p. 2) in
the hopes of refuting them. Argument
One—the “Freedom and Causality”
argument—is based on Habermas’s
understanding of the nature of psycho-
therapeutic work in lifting repression.
Habermas conceptualizes repression
in the unconscious in terms of causal
processes, which are “suppressive” and
“dominating,” whereas psychoanalysis
is a hermeneutic process that is “con-
ceptualized as a communicative process
governed by the idea of the ‘unforced
force of the better argument’” (Axmacher,
2013, p. 2). Argument Two claims that
“causal explanations state an inevitable
and lawful relationship between cause
and effect” (Axmacher, 2013, p. 2),
while “hermeneutic explanations rely
on deferred reconstructions” (Axmacher,
2013, p. 2). What is meant by “deferred
reconstructions” is not spelled out, but I
take it to mean that hermeneutic expla-
nations do not refer to deterministic
causal laws. Argument Three claims that
the relationship between a cause and its
effect in empirical observations needs
to be discovered and is falsifiable, while
hermeneutic-type explanations, which are
typically given in the first-person, are both
unsurprising and unfalsifiable, and hence
not causal.
I first examine Axmacher’s responses
to arguments One and Three, leaving dis-
cussion about Argument Two for later.
Against Argument One, Axmacher rightly
raises a concern that Habermas’s account
of repression—which Habermas describes
as being governed by causal laws char-
acteristic of the natural sciences—is
inconsistent with his understanding of
the hermeneutic nature of psychoanalysis
more broadly. Axmacher objects that “it
remains unclear how the therapeutic tran-
sition from causal laws to hermeneutic
relationships should occur” (Axmacher,
2013, p. 2). This seems an appropriate
objection to Habermas, whose under-
standing of repression conflicts with the
way that many psychoanalysts understand
it. Freud, for example, writes about repres-
sion in psychological terms: “the essence of
repression lies simply in turning something
away, and keeping it at a distance, from the
conscious” [Freud, 1985 (1915), p. 147, ital-
ics in original]. This description is clearly
not a complete analysis of the nature of
repression, but there can be no doubt that
Freud, despite being a materialist, explains
repression in psychological, not scien-
tific, terms. I thus agree with Axmacher’s
concerns regarding Habermas’s
characterization of the nature of
repression.
Axmacher’s response to the Argument
Three—that psychoanalytic explanations
are unfalsifiable and different in kind
from scientific explanations—is to deny
the transparency and unfalsifiablity of psy-
chological explanation.
It has been suggested that these char-
acteristics of hypotheses on causal
relationships (to be surprising and fal-
sifiable) do not apply for explanations
of actions by a reason. According to
this line of argumentation, a typical
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explanation from a first-person-
perspective (e.g., “Why have you left
the party?” – “Because it’s time for bed
and I want to go home”) cannot be falsi-
fied: in these explanations, “[. . . ] there is
no question of ‘giving one’s evidence’ or
of ‘making a mistake’” (Toulmin, 1948,
p. 25; quoted in Axmacher, 2013, p. 3).
Axmacher, in response to Toulmin, claims
that first-person explanations may be nei-
ther transparent nor unfalsifiable, and
thus no different in kind from causal
explanations—“the transparency of the
causes of one’s own behavior is only ficti-
tious” (Axmacher, 2013, p. 3), because we
may be wrong about our reasons for act-
ing. If this were all that Argument Three
were saying, then Axmacher would be
correct to dismiss it. However, Toulmin
does not seem to be making the argu-
ment attributed to him. In his 1948
paper, Toulmin distinguishes psychoana-
lytic explanations from ordinary psycho-
logical explanations of behavior. A correct
psychoanalytic explanation must fulfill
three criteria, one of which is that “the
patient must come to recognize it as a
natural . . . expression of his neurotic state
of mind” (Toulmin, 1948, p. 28); the
other two criteria are that the psycho-
analytic explanation must be plausible to
a third party familiar with the patient,
and the explanation must invoke relevant
facts about the patient’s early life. Toulmin
states that a patient “must come to recog-
nize” an explanation as the expression of
his “neurotic state of mind:” this empha-
sizes that such explanations are usually
not initially transparent to the person,
and they later replace the ordinary psy-
chological explanations of his actions. So
Toulmin, contrary to Axmacher’s sugges-
tion, is aware that psychoanalytic explana-
tions may at times fail to be transparent to
an agent, and that they are therefore also
falsifiable.
Toulmin does, however, distinguish
between psychoanalytic explanations and
other kinds of causal explanations; he
states that we have “grounds for regard-
ing the techniques of psycho-analysis as
potentially “rational,” in a way in which
hypnotic suggestion, brain surgery and
insulin treatment cannot be” (Toulmin,
1948, p. 28). Toulmin says that in psycho-
analysis we appeal to a person’s reasons,
and these tell a different causal story from
brain surgery. Axmacher would disagree
with Toulmin here as well; for a fuller
discussion of why I think that Toulmin
is right about this, I shall proceed to
Argument Two; I argue that Axmacher’s
objections to Argument Two can be coun-
tered by those who think that there is an
important distinction to be made between
psychoanalytic explanations on the one
hand, and causal explanations in the nat-
ural sciences on the other.
Argument Two claims that “causal
explanations state an inevitable and law-
ful relationship between cause and effect”
while “hermeneutic explanations rely on
deferred reconstructions” (Axmacher,
2013, p. 2). Axmacher argues, however,
that psychoanalytic explanations can be
understood as causal, and that there is thus
no difference in kind between causal and
hermeneutic explanations. In defense of
this claim, Axmacher offers the following:
When I ask someone, “Why didn’t
you come to work yesterday?” and he
responds “Because I was sick,” then his
staying at home is considered as an
inevitable effect of his disease . . . this cri-
terion exactly describes a characteristic
feature of psychoanalytic interpretation
(Axmacher, 2013, p. 2).
Axmacher concludes that psychoanalytic
interpretations must tell a causal story
because, like causal explanations in the
sciences, they “give sufficient, but not nec-
essary explanations of psychopathologi-
cal symptoms” (Axmacher, 2013, p. 3).
This seems right: if psychoanalysis did not
appeal to causation, it would have lit-
tle explanatory and therapeutic value. But
are the causal stories the same? Those of
us who think not would argue, follow-
ing the philosopher Donald Davidson, that
a central difference between psychologi-
cal explanations, and causal explanations
in the sciences, is that the latter, but not
the former, appeal to generalizable laws.
Davidson argued that, although psycho-
logical events, like physical events, feature
in causal relations, only the latter feature in
causal laws. We can cite causes and effects
of particular psychological events, but we
can never cite the law under which these
events are subsumed, because there are
no psychological laws. The mental realm,
according to Davidson, is anomalous. This
is not the case for the physical sciences. The
relation between a disease and its symp-
tom, for example, is explained by citing a
general law—if you contract the HI virus,
you are likely, ceteris paribus, to develop
AIDS. Such a law is not exceptionless, but
we are able to spell out, at least in principle,
the nature of the relevant ceteris paribus
conditions. But, as Davidson noted, this is
not possible in psychological explanations:
What prevents us from giving neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for act-
ing on a reason also prevents us from
giving serious laws connecting reasons
and actions. To see this, suppose we had
the sufficient conditions. Then we could
say: whenever a man has such-and-such
beliefs and desires, and such-and-such
further conditions are satisfied, he will
act in such-and-such a way. There are
no serious laws of this kind (Davidson,
2001, p. 233).
There are no serious laws of this kind
because we must always, as a matter of
principle, refer back to the beliefs and
desires of the agent: for instance, we may
say that a person who believes that it is
raining and who desires not to get wet
will, ceteris paribus, take an umbrella out-
side. But we cannot spell out the nature
of these ceteris paribus conditions: a per-
son may not believe that the umbrella will
keep him dry; or he may have a stronger
desire to win a bet, or he may wish to get
wet while singing in the rain. The set of
disjunctives is open-ended as a matter of
principle, whereas this is not the case in the
physical sciences.
Davidson does not deny that we are
able to cite sufficient conditions for a par-
ticular action, for he does not deny that
psychological events are caused—by other
psychological events, and also by physi-
cal events. A psychoanalyst can confidently
predict that her paranoid analysand will
become angry when she announces that
she is taking a holiday because he has dif-
ficulties dealing with loss. But Davidson
argues that these particular causal rela-
tions are not subsumable under general
psychological laws: “Causality and identity
are relations between individual events no
matter how described. But laws are linguis-
tic; and so events can instantiate laws, and
hence be explained or predicted in the light
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of laws, only as those events are described
in one or another way” (Davidson, 2001, p.
215). And events described as psychologi-
cal cannot be explained or predicted on the
basis of psychological laws because there
are no such laws.
The philosopher Richard Wollheim
makes a similar argument in discussing the
central role that phenomenology plays in
psychoanalysis. He writes:
“Cause” is a fully extensional relation,
“causally explain” is not. If physics
or physiology discovers that one event
causes another, then we can assert this
connection under any description of the
two events . . . The same does not hold
for “causally explains.” To say that one
event causally explains another is true
only for those descriptions of the two
events which pick out whatever feature
of them it is in virtue of which one
causes the other (Wollheim, 1993, p. 89).
Thus, although both psychological and
physical events feature in causal expla-
nations, there is a fundamental differ-
ence between hermeneutic-type explana-
tions characteristic of psychoanalysis (and
folk psychology more broadly), and causal
explanations characteristic of the sciences.
This difference is a principled one—
according to Davidson, the physical is
subject to descriptive physical laws, while
the psychological is normative, subject
to the standards of rationality, consti-
tuted by mental holism, and anomalous.
The absence of strict laws does not pre-
clude the existence of psychoanalytic gen-
eralizations about human behavior, but
these generalizations—unlike those of the
natural sciences—are not expressible as
strict causal laws. We cannot give an
account of psychoanalytic behavior by
appealing to the causal laws of the
natural sciences without changing the
subject.
If this is so, then, even if mental
events feature in causal explanations, this
is insufficient to argue for an integra-
tion of psychoanalysis with neuroscience.
Axmacher’s position does not get to the
heart of the divide between psychoanalytic
and scientific (including neuroscientific)
explanations—namely that causal expla-
nation in psychoanalysis describe phe-
nomena in terms of radically different sys-
tems of concepts from those described in
the neurosciences. Causal explanations in
psychoanalysis make use of a fundamen-
tally different system of kinds than those
in the neurosciences. These fundamental
differences raises serious questions about
attempts to bring these two disciplines
together, and should serve as a caution-
ary tale for both psychoanalytic metapsy-
chology, and particularly for defenders of
neuropsychoanalysis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to thank the journal
reviewers for helpful comments and
assistance.
REFERENCES
Axmacher, N. (2013). Causation in psychoanalysis.
Front. Psychol. 4:77. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00077
Davidson, D. (2001). “Psychology as phi-
losophy,” in Essays on Actions and Events
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), 229–238. doi:
10.1093/0199246270.003.0012
Freud, S. (1985). “Repression,” in The Pelican Freud
Library Volume 11: On Metapsychology: The
Theory of Psychoanalysis, Trans ed J. Strachey
and A. Richards (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin Books), 139–158. Originally published
in 1915.
Toulmin, S. (1948). The logical status of psycho-
analysis. Analysis 9, 23–29. doi: 10.1093/analys/
9.2.23
Wollheim, R. (1993). “Psychology, materialism, and
the special case of sexuality,” in The Mind and
Its Depths (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press), 79–90.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 06 August 2014; accepted: 22 September 2014;
published online: 13 October 2014.
Citation: Galgut E (2014) Causation vs. causal expla-
nation: a response to Axmacher. Front. Psychol. 5:1148.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01148
This article was submitted to Psychoanalysis and
Neuropsychoanalysis, a section of the journal Frontiers
in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Galgut. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accor-
dance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribu-
tion or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1148 | 3
